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Abstract
In this paper, I solve a puzzle generated by three conflicting claims about the relationship between 
faith, belief, and control: according to (1) the Identity Thesis, faith is a type of belief, and accord-
ing to (2) Fideistic Voluntarism, we sometimes have control over whether or not we have faith, but 
according to (3) Doxastic Involuntarism, we never have control over what we believe. To solve the 
puzzle, I argue that the Identity Thesis is true, but that either (2) or (3) is false, depending on how 
we understand “control.” I distinguish two notions of control: direct intention- based control and 
indirect reflective control. I argue that though we have direct intention- based control over neither 
belief nor faith, we have indirect reflective control over each of them. Moreover, indirect reflective 
control helps explain how we can be held accountable for each.
have indirect reflective control over both faith 
and belief, we have direct intention- based 
control over neither. I proceed by address-
ing each thesis in turn. In § 1, I argue for the 
Identity Thesis and defend it from objections. 
In § 2, I provide the motivation for thinking 
that Doxastic Involuntarism is true, provided 
that we understand doxastic control as direct 
intention- based control, which is a form of 
control that we have over our actions. In § 3, 
I provide the strongest motivation for thinking 
that under that same interpretation of control, 
Fideistic Voluntarism is also true. In brief, 
positing this control helps explain two main 
practices we regularly engage in with respect 
to faith. However, I then mount an argument 
against the view that we have direct intention- 
based control over whether we have faith, 
which leaves us with the need to explain these 
practices some other way. In § 4, I offer this 
explanation by defending the view that we 
have indirect reflective control over whether 
we have faith. Thus, the tension between the 
Introduction
In this paper, I solve a puzzle about the 
nature of faith. Here are three common views 
about the connections between belief, faith, 
and control:
(1) Identity Thesis: Faith is a kind of belief.
(2) Doxastic Involuntarism: We never have 
control over what we believe.
(3) Fideistic Voluntarism: We sometimes have 
control over whether or not we have faith.
 Though each is well- motivated, together 
they form an inconsistent triad. So, we must 
abandon at least one of them. Call this the 
Control Puzzle.
 I aim to solve this puzzle by arguing that (1) 
is true, but either (2) or (3) is false depending 
on how we understand “control.” I distinguish 
two notions of control: direct intention- based 
control and indirect reflective control. once 
we clarify the sort of control we have over 
faith and belief, it becomes clear that we have 
the same kind of control over each: while we 
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three theses that generate the Control Puzzle 
is resolved when we properly disambiguate 
the sort of control at issue.
 Before I proceed, let me clarify that the 
sense of faith that I’m concerned with is faith 
as an attitude or mental state rather than a 
set of doctrines or an ideology. In particular, 
I focus on propositional faith—faith that p. 
This is the sort of faith at issue when we 
say, for example: “She has faith that her son 
will do the right thing.” “He has faith that 
he’ll survive.” “I have faith that God exists.” 
My discussion applies to both religious 
and nonreligious faith. Propositional faith 
is distinct from objectual faith, which is 
having faith in a person or object.1 It’s also 
distinct from being faithful or keeping faith 
with someone. Though these forms of faith 
are all connected in interesting ways, I limit 
discussion to propositional faith, because 
such faith is plausibly a more basic unit of 
faith than the other forms.2 also, the Identity 
Thesis is most plausible for propositional 
faith.
1. The Identity Thesis
 I begin with the Identity Thesis, according 
to which faith is a kind of belief. In what 
follows, I explain the thesis in more detail, 
show how it has figured in the literature on 
faith and belief thus far, and defend it from 
an objection.
 as mentioned above, I conceive of faith, 
like belief, as a mental state. a prominent 
way to individuate mental states is in terms 
of their functional roles. Beliefs are different 
than say, desires or wishes, because beliefs 
function differently than desires and wishes. 
according to this sort of analytic functional-
ism about mental states, to claim that faith is 
a type of belief is to claim that any state that 
plays the functional role of faith also plays 
the functional role of belief.3 For all x, if x is 
a faith- state, then x is a belief- state. alterna-
tively, we might say that faith is a determinate 
of the determinable, belief.
 Let me offer three important clarifications 
of the Identity Thesis to avoid confusion. 
First, while every faith- state is a belief- state, 
it’s not the case that according to the Identity 
Thesis, every belief- state is a faith- state. To 
illustrate via analogy, faith is to belief what 
dogs are to animals: while every dog is an 
animal, it is not the case that every animal 
is a dog. It’s important to recognize that the 
Identity Thesis is not claiming that belief is 
sufficient for faith. It’s simply claiming that 
any state that plays the faith role must include 
the state that plays the belief role.
 Second, the Identity Thesis does not claim 
that faith is merely a kind of belief; instead, 
the thesis is consistent with the claim that 
faith is a kind of belief inter alia. In particular, 
it’s likely that propositional faith is also a type 
of pro- attitude, such as a desire.4 If I hate the 
idea of my preferred third- party candidate 
losing the presidential election, I can hardly 
be said to have faith that she will lose, even 
if I believe that she will. These types of cases 
support the view that a person has faith that 
p only if she has some kind of pro- attitude 
toward the proposition p. additionally, one 
might hold that a person has faith that p only 
if she has some kind of intention to act as if 
p were true. In that case, having faith that p 
is also, inter alia, a kind of intention. For the 
purposes of this paper, I remain neutral with 
respect to the relationship between faith and 
other attitudes and mental states. I focus on 
the relationship between faith and belief, as 
stated in the Identity Thesis.5
 Third, the Identity Thesis is neutral with 
respect to the specific belief that faith is. Thus 
faith that p might be identified with belief 
that p, where one believes the proposition 
that one has faith in. alternatively, faith that 
p might be identified with the belief that p is 
likely or more likely than other competing 
propositions. 
 The Identity Thesis makes sense of claims 
that are often made about the relationship 
between faith and belief in the philosophical 
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and theological literature on faith, as well as 
various claims made by non- philosophers. 
according to what Daniel Howard- Snyder 
calls the “Common View” of faith (2013, p. 
357), belief is a necessary condition for faith 
or else faith is partly constituted by belief. But 
the necessity claim and the constitution claim 
are each mysterious in a way that the Identity 
Thesis, as I understand it, is not. In particular, 
if we claim that belief is a necessary condi-
tion for faith, then it seems we have to posit 
a necessary connection between two distinct 
existences—a faith mental state and a belief 
mental state. But it’s unclear what a faith- state 
and a belief- state are, not to mention exactly 
how they are related.6 as for constitution, 
we know what it is for a material entity to be 
fully or partly constituted by another mate-
rial entity. But it’s not at all clear what the 
analogous constitution or composition rela-
tion would be in the case of mental states: 
faith is not literally composed of belief like 
a statue is composed of clay.7 Fortunately, the 
Identity Thesis captures the idea that there’s 
a necessary connection between faith and 
belief without positing necessary connections 
between distinct existences. and it captures 
the idea that faith has belief as a constitutive 
part without relying on the analogy with 
material constitution.8
 Something like the Identity Thesis is widely 
endorsed. In philosophical writing, Richard 
Swinburne attributes the first form of a view 
like the Identity Thesis to Thomas aquinas, 
and calls it the Thomist view.9 William alston 
attributes the emphasis on cognitive elements 
of faith in the literature on religious faith to 
the first Vatican Council and John Locke, in 
addition to aquinas. alston quotes aquinas 
as saying: “The act of faith is an act of the 
intellect assenting to divine truth at the com-
mand of the will moved by the grace of God”; 
and he quotes Locke as characterizing faith 
as “the assent to any proposition, not thus 
made out by the deductions of reason, but 
upon the credit of the proposer, as coming 
from God, in some extraordinary way of com-
munication.”10 Insofar as the mental assent 
referenced in these passages bears similarity 
to the cognitive element of judgment involved 
in belief, these characterizations of faith can 
be used to articulate the view that faith is a 
type of belief.11
 In addition to various philosophers, many 
Western theologians writing on the nature of 
religious faith also presuppose the view that 
faith is a type of belief.12 For example, in the 
Christian tradition, to have faith in God is, 
inter alia, to believe that God exists, which 
also may involve believing various proposi-
tions concerning the nature of God; and the 
sort of faith that is necessary for human salva-
tion involves believing particular propositions 
about God’s plan and the person and work of 
Jesus.13
 another strand in both philosophical and 
non- philosophical literature that connects 
faith and belief is the idea that the essence of 
faith is belief based on poor grounds. Howard- 
Snyder cites as evidence alex Rosenberg, 
“faith is by definition belief in the absence 
of evidence,” and Richard Dawkins, “faith is 
belief in spite of, even perhaps because of, the 
lack of evidence” (quoted in Howard- Snyder 
2013, pp. 368–369). Many of those we might 
think of as “the folk” take faith to consist in 
belief of this sort as well. The Wikipedia entry 
on faith (edited by the people for the people) 
cites dictionary.com in its definition of faith as 
“belief that is not based on proof.”14 Though 
this doesn’t go quite as far as Mark Twain, 
who is often quoted in recent faith literature 
as saying that “faith is believing what you 
know ain’t so,” the idea is similar in spirit: at 
least part of what defines faith is its essential 
connection with a particular kind of belief, 
namely, unjustified belief. Indeed, many 
challenges to religious faith object to it on the 
grounds that faith is a type of epistemically 
irrational belief.15
 So we have seen that the Identity Thesis is 
commonly presupposed. But why should we 
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think that it is true? That is, why think that 
all faith states are belief states? I now turn to 
a defense of the Identity Thesis.
 To begin, if we assume analytic function-
alism, then what it is to be a mental state of 
kind K is to play the K- role with respect to 
other mental states, perceptions, and behav-
ior. each mental state has a functional profile 
that distinguishes it from other mental states. 
accordingly, what it is for a mental state to be 
a belief is to play the belief- role, and what it 
is for a mental state to be faith is to play the 
faith- role. To say that one particular mental 
state A is a kind of mental state B is to say 
that the functional profile of A includes the 
functional profile of B. That is, anything that 
satisfies the functional criteria for being A 
also satisfies the functional criteria for be-
ing B. This is exactly what we find with the 
mental states of faith and belief. When we 
consider the faith- role, we find that the func-
tional profile of the person who has faith that 
p includes the functional profile of the person 
who believes that p.16 When a person has faith 
that p, she has settled the matter in a way that 
is reflected in, or indicated by, her feelings, 
her other attitudes, and her actions. She also 
tends to use p as a premise in her practical 
and theoretical reasoning. The same is true of 
the person who believes that p is true: she has 
settled the matter in a way that’s reflected in 
her feelings, her other attitudes, her actions, 
and her reasoning.
 Consider some examples: a person who has 
faith that she will do really well on her piano 
performance tends to be very calm and col-
lected prior to the performance. So also if she 
believes that she will do well. The person who 
has faith that helping people is its own reward 
will tend to help people a lot. So also if she 
believes that helping people is its own reward. 
The idea here is that a person with faith that 
p is committed to the truth of p in a way that 
is reflected in her other mental states and her 
behavior. This same commitment is true of 
belief. We therefore have reason to hold that 
faith is a type of belief. The mental states that 
play the faith- role include the mental states 
that play the belief- role. Therefore, the Iden-
tity Thesis is true: faith is a type of belief. 
 Despite this, some have advocated that we 
give up on the view that faith that p requires 
any kind of belief regarding p’s truth and in-
stead opt for some other “weaker” cognitive 
attitude. For example, William alston (1996) 
substitutes acceptance that p for belief that 
p. Daniel Howard- Snyder (2013) advocates 
the view that while faith that p requires what 
he calls a positive cognitive stance toward p, 
belief is not the only cognitive attitude that 
can satisfy this requirement; nondoxastic 
attitudes, including acceptance and assump-
tion, can also do the job. Daniel McKaughan 
(2013) similarly advocates that faith that p is 
compatible with a wide range of what he calls 
epistemic opinions—“opinions formed solely 
with respect to considerations that one takes 
to bear on the truth or falsity of a proposition” 
(p. 117). Such opinions include belief, but 
also include “trusting acceptance” and “hope-
ful affirmation” (McKaughan 2013, p. 117). 
alston, Howard- Snyder, and McKaughan are 
each motivated in part by their view of the 
relationship between faith and doubt. The 
thought is that doubt seems incompatible with 
belief but compatible with faith. 
 For example, Howard- Snyder describes 
a case of a man in the wilderness, Captain 
Morgan, who’s bitten by a rattlesnake and 
must decide which direction to go to get 
help. Morgan’s maps don’t give him any 
reason to favor backtracking over forging 
ahead (or vice versa), but he slightly prefers 
forging ahead. So, though he’s in doubt about 
whether help lies ahead, he stumbles forward 
on the assumption that it does (2013, p. 364). 
Howard- Snyder thinks Captain Morgan is 
aptly described as having faith that help lies 
ahead, and yet Morgan fails to believe it—
he merely assumes it. alternatively, Daniel 
McKaughan appeals to the case of Mother 
Teresa, who despite reporting experiences of 
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great doubt concerning the existence of God, 
is considered by many to have had great faith 
in God (2013, p. 106). In response, notice that 
there are many forms of doubt: a person might 
doubt that p, doubt whether p, be in doubt 
about whether p, or have doubts about p.17 
When we examine the relationship between 
faith, belief, and these forms of doubt, I think 
we find that both faith that p and belief that 
p are equally compatible with some forms of 
doubt, and equally incompatible with other 
forms of doubt. Thus, we should not conclude 
that the relationship between faith and doubt 
entails that faith is not a type of belief.
 Consider belief. Belief that p does not re-
quire certainty that p, so, any form of doubt 
that simply refers to lack of certainty is com-
patible with belief. For example, if I believe 
that p and yet experience a moment of doubt 
concerning its truth or concerning the strength 
of my evidence for p, I do not thereby cease 
to believe that p in that moment. Believing 
that p is compatible with what we might call 
weak doubt—any form of doubt that involves 
a mere lack of certainty. So the fact that faith 
is also compatible with weak doubt does not 
impugn the claim that faith is a type of belief.
 However, belief is not compatible with 
what we might call strong doubt—doubt 
that lowers a person’s credence below the 
threshold required for belief. For example, 
the strongest form of doubt—namely, doubt 
that p—is much more robust than simply 
lacking full certainty about p or having a 
moment of uncertainty about its truth. The 
functional profile of the person who doubts 
that p includes features that are excluded from 
the functional profile of the person who be-
lieves that p. Doubt that p tends to issue in fear 
that the thing one wants to happen or hopes 
will happen will not happen. For example, if 
I doubt that the Packers will beat the Bears, 
then I will tend to feel anxious when they’re 
down a couple touchdowns. I will feel ner-
vous that their current performance and score 
confirm that they won’t win. I might get upset 
or depressed. But if I believe that the Packers 
will win, I will not have these anxieties and 
fears.
 But now notice that the functional profile 
of the person with faith that the Packers will 
win aligns with the profile of the person who 
believes it, not the profile of the person who 
doubts it. Indeed, faith seems to engender 
the opposite of anxiety and fear—the person 
with faith that p, who would otherwise fear 
that not p, rests more calmly in her confidence 
that p. Though strong doubt is incompatible 
with belief that p, it is also incompatible with 
faith that p.18 Various common locutions also 
support this. a common response to a friend 
with strong doubt might be to ask “Why did 
you doubt me? you should have had faith that 
I would be there.” With respect to religious 
faith, phrases such as “o ye of little faith, why 
did you doubt?” imply that to the extent that 
one has this doubt, one lacks faith.
 of course, faith plausibly comes in de-
grees—a person might have weak or strong 
faith. If my faith that my husband will remain 
faithful is weak, then I will tend to be more 
anxious when he’s out to unknown places, 
or at least more anxious than I would be if I 
had strong faith. But even so, it’s plausible to 
think that belief also comes in degrees. If I’m 
very confident in the belief that my husband is 
faithful, I will have very little, if any, anxiety 
during his late night unknown outings; the 
less confident I am, the more anxiety I’ll 
tend to feel. So, again, faith and belief seem 
equally compatible or equally incompatible 
with particular forms of doubt. Therefore, I 
conclude that considerations concerning the 
relationship between faith and doubt do not 
impugn the Identity Thesis. We should main-
tain the view that faith is a type of belief.
2. Doxastic Involuntarism
 We turn to the thesis of Doxastic Invol-
untarism—that we never have control over 
what we believe.19 This view gains support 
from both philosophers and non- philosophers 
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alike. of course, there are many ways to 
understand what it is for something to be 
voluntary—there are many senses of con-
trol. So it’s important to clarify how we 
should understand Doxastic Involuntarism. 
one plausible way to interpret the thesis is 
by contrasting our control over belief with 
our control over our actions. It seems that 
we can decide or choose to act in a way that 
we cannot choose to believe. Call the sort of 
control that we have over our actions direct 
intention- based control. an agent has direct 
intention- based control over φ- ing just in 
case she can φ directly as the result of an 
intention to φ. William alston (1988) has 
famously and persuasively argued that we 
lack this control over our beliefs. If an agent 
has direct intention- based control over belief, 
then she has the ability to believe that p as a 
result of a specific intention to believe that 
p, which she carries out either immediately 
just by believing p or fairly immediately by 
performing other actions in one uninterrupted 
session, that results in her believing p. How-
ever, we cannot believe that the capital of 
Hawaii is Croatia immediately as a result of 
an intention to believe it, nor can we manage 
to believe this by performing other actions in 
one uninterrupted session that results in the 
belief. If we try it, we simply don’t succeed 
(alston 1988, p. 263). Contrast this with our 
control over action: we can clap our hands 
together immediately as a result of an inten-
tion to do so, and we can bake a cake in one 
uninterrupted session by performing other 
actions in service of baking the cake.
 While alston argues that we lack direct 
intention- based control over our beliefs as 
matter of contingent fact, some have argued 
that this inability is a matter of necessity.20 For 
example, Pamela Hieronymi (2006) argues 
that we lack what I’ve called direct intention- 
based control over belief because belief is 
what she calls a commitment- constituted at-
titude: “To believe that p is to be committed 
to p as true—to take p to be true in a way that 
leaves one answerable to certain questions 
and criticisms” (2006, p. 50). For example, if 
I believe that brewing coffee in a Chemex is 
superior to brewing it in a coffeemaker, then 
I can appropriately be asked why I believe 
this, and I can appropriately be criticized if 
I’m wrong about the considerations I took 
to bear on the superiority of the Chemex. 
The commitment- to- truth that constitutes 
belief distinguishes it from action because 
performing an action is not a commitment to 
truth but rather a commitment to the worth 
of the action in question. While an agent can 
perform an action for any reason taken to 
count in favor of the worth of the action, one 
cannot believe that p for any reason taken 
to count in favor of the worth of the belief. 
Instead, one can only believe that p—that is, 
commit to the truth of p—for reasons one 
takes to count in favor of the truth of p.21 In 
this way, Hieronymi argues that necessarily, 
given the nature of belief, we do not have the 
same control over belief that we have over 
action.
 So, if we understand Doxastic Involuntarism 
as the thesis that we lack direct intention- based 
control over what we believe, then the thesis is 
true. We have strong reasons to maintain that 
belief is an attitude over which we lack direct 
intention- based control—a form of control we 
have over our actions. alston’s considerations 
support this view as a contingent fact. and if 
Hieronymi’s account is correct, the reason we 
lack direct intention- based doxastic control is 
because we cannot believe that p on the basis 
of any reason taken to count in favor of p in-
dependently of counting in favor of the truth 
of p. To maintain otherwise would be to accept 
that we can believe that, for example, Barack 
obama is the Prime Minister of Norway for 
reasons taken to be independent of the truth. 
But we shouldn’t accept this.
3. Fideistic Voluntarism
 We now turn to our control over faith: many 
philosophers and theologians think that faith 
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is voluntary—that is, that we sometimes have 
control over whether or not we have faith.22 
This is what I’ve called Fideistic Voluntarism. 
But again there are many senses of control, 
so to evaluate Fideistic Voluntarism, we 
must specify the sense of control at issue. 
When it comes to faith, I think the idea that 
we can choose to have faith just as we can 
choose to act is much more appealing than 
when it comes to belief. In particular, I see 
two main motivations for accepting Fideistic 
Voluntarism understood in terms of direct 
intention- based control; one motivation per-
tains to the way in which we direct others 
to have faith, and the other pertains to how 
people are held accountable for faith. I pres-
ent these two motivations in what follows. 
However, afterward, I will argue that we do 
not in fact have direct intention- based con-
trol over whether we have faith. This leaves 
us with the burden of explaining these two 
motivations some other way.
 First, consider some ways in which people 
talk about propositional faith in everyday 
discourse: we encourage a student about to 
perform a violin solo before a large audience 
to have faith that she’ll do a great job; we 
exhort a patient in physical therapy to have 
faith that she’ll regain full usage of her arm; 
we tell a person who’s feeling very down to 
“have faith that things will not always be this 
way,” and so on. Sometimes people merely 
suggest or recommend that others have faith. 
other times they strongly exhort them or 
even command them to: think of one spouse 
shouting to the other after a long argument: 
“Just have faith that I’ll do it!” In any case, 
whether merely a suggestion or a command, 
the speech acts presuppose in some sense that 
the agent in question has some kind of control 
over having the faith that is being encouraged, 
commanded, or what have you.
 The way that many people encourage others 
to have propositional faith is very similar to 
the way that people encourage others to act 
in various ways. Just as I might tell someone 
to take a vacation when she’s been work-
ing too hard, so also I might tell someone 
to have faith that she’ll do great when she’s 
been worrying too much about her upcoming 
performance review. Insofar as suggestions 
and commands to have faith bear similarity 
to suggestions and commands to act, this is 
some reason to think that faith is under our 
control in the same way that action is. at the 
very least, propositional faith needs to be 
under our control in a way that would make 
sense of the fact that people often encourage 
others to have it. If faith is not under our 
control at all, then there is pressure to explain 
why encouragement of others in the ways 
listed above is not somehow inappropriate 
or misguided.23
 The second common practice that presup-
poses that we have a control over faith similar 
to our control over action is that we hold 
people accountable for having and lacking 
faith in the same way that we hold people 
accountable for their actions. In particular, 
we often blame others for their faith if hav-
ing such faith has negative consequences of 
some kind. For example, in the 2012 movie 
Stuck in Love, Samantha blames her father for 
maintaining faith that his ex- wife will return 
to him even after she’s remarried. Samantha 
resents her father for not giving up his faith, 
given that it’s ruining his emotional health 
and his relationship with her and others. also, 
as I briefly mentioned in § 1, some religious 
faith is often objected to on the grounds that 
it’s irrational and even dangerous. While 
this sometimes amounts merely to a form of 
criticism or negative evaluation, many times 
it takes the form of blaming the person for 
such faith.
 additionally, many Western religious tra-
ditions maintain that faith is an integral part 
of a person’s salvation. according to certain 
religions, the quality of a person’s afterlife 
depends (partly or wholly) on whether she has 
faith that God exists. The Christian religious 
tradition takes God to have commanded faith 
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as a prerequisite for salvation; in order to be 
saved, one must have faith in God and faith 
that various things God has said are true.24 
So a lot hangs on whether a person has faith. 
one way to explain why it’s not unfair for 
God to hold us accountable for whether we 
have faith is to maintain that we have control 
over whether we have faith just as we have 
control over whether we do the right thing.
 So we have two major practices regarding 
faith that seem to presuppose that we some-
times have control over whether or not we 
have faith and, in particular, that this control 
is the same sort of control that we have over 
our actions: the practice of directing people 
to have faith in various ways and the practice 
of holding people accountable for their faith. 
The sort of control we have over our actions 
helps explain the legitimacy of holding people 
accountable for their actions. So, in order to 
help explain the legitimacy of directing and 
holding people accountable for their faith, 
one might reasonably hold that we have this 
same type of control over whether we have 
faith.
 However, in order to have direct intention- 
based control over whether we have faith, 
faith needs to be the sort of thing that an agent 
can have directly as a result of an intention, 
just as performing an action is the sort of thing 
that an agent can do directly as a result of an 
intention. Since having direct intention- based 
control over our actions means that we can 
perform an action for any reason that counts 
in favor of so acting, then similarly, having di-
rect intention- based control over faith would 
mean that we can generate faith for any reason 
that counts in favor of such faith. Borrowing 
Hieronymi’s framework for understanding 
commitment- based attitudes, as discussed in 
§ 2, agents would need the ability to commit 
to having faith for any reason bearing on the 
goodness or worth of having faith. after all, 
we can commit to acting for any reason that 
counts in favor of the goodness or worth of 
so acting. But can we decide to have faith for 
such reasons? I think that examining in detail 
how we come to have faith reveals that we 
cannot.
 Consider a case in which you suspect that 
your spouse isn’t working very hard to find 
a new job—you worry that he or she is just 
being lazy. But you’re convinced by the 
marriage therapists that it really is better for 
your relationship that you have faith that your 
spouse is working hard. Here, you have a 
reason that counts in favor having such faith, 
but which is independent of any consider-
ations in favor of the truth of the content of 
such faith. Can you thereby generate faith 
that your spouse is in fact working hard? It 
seems not. of course, you could learn more 
about how your spouse is spending time, 
and try to gain more evidence about his or 
her mind- set. or you could try to convince 
yourself one way or the other regardless of 
the evidence by just trying to never think 
about your spouse’s work ethic. But either 
way, simply being convinced of the value of 
having faith in your spouse’s work ethic does 
not seem sufficient to get you to have faith. 
Reflection on this case reveals that we lack 
direct intention- based control over faith.
 Notice that if we could have faith on the 
basis of considerations that bear on the value 
of having faith, then we should be able to 
generate or maintain faith that p even if we 
disbelieve that p. We could also generate 
faith that p even if we didn’t desire p, for 
example, if we hated the idea of p being true. 
our ability to have faith would be like our 
ability to imagine that p. This is something 
we can do for any consideration that bears 
on the goodness of doing the imagining that 
p regardless of the truth or desirability of 
the content of the imagining. But faith that 
p is incompatible with disbelieving p, and it 
also seems incompatible with not desiring 
p.25 So we cannot have faith simply on the 
basis of considerations that bear on the good-
ness of having such faith, just as we cannot 
believe something simply on the basis of 
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considerations that bear on the goodness of 
having the belief.
4. Solving the Puzzle
 Let’s pull together the strands of the pre-
ceding three sections. The Control Puzzle is 
generated when we maintain that (1) faith is 
a kind of belief, and that (2) we sometimes 
have control over whether we have faith, but 
that (3) we never have control over what we 
believe. The sort of control we’ve been con-
sidering with respect to both faith and belief 
is direct intention- based control—control 
we have over our actions. When Fideistic 
Voluntarism and Doxastic Involuntarism are 
each understood in terms of direct intention- 
based control, they generate an inconsistency 
in combination with the Identity Thesis. 
However, I’ve argued in the previous section 
that we do not in fact have direct intention- 
based control over faith—that is, Fideistic 
Voluntarism understood in terms of direct 
intention- based control is false. This resolves 
the tension of the Control Puzzle. But it leaves 
us with the difficulty of explaining the legiti-
macy of encouraging people to have faith and 
of holding people accountable for their faith.
 Moreover, the problem gets worse when we 
realize that we also engage in these practices 
with respect to belief. We direct and encour-
age people to believe in certain ways, just 
as we direct and encourage them to act in 
certain ways. We also blame people for their 
beliefs, as when, for example, people believe 
things that are unjustified or irrational, or fail 
to believe what they have sufficient reason to 
believe. While, of course, a great deal more 
must be said about this phenomenon, suffice 
it to say that such practices are likely to be 
illegitimate unless agents have the right kind 
of control over their beliefs.
 Fortunately, I will argue in what follows 
that we do have a form of control over our 
beliefs that helps explain the legitimacy of di-
recting people with regard to their beliefs and 
the legitimacy of holding them accountable 
for their beliefs. after I articulate this control, 
I will argue that we also have such control 
over whether we have faith.
 Consider that we are often able to influence 
what we believe by critically reflecting on the 
reasons and evidence for various beliefs. We 
can execute intentions to critically reflect on 
the basis of our currently held beliefs or on 
potential reasons for acquiring new beliefs. 
and when we do so, we make a positive 
epistemic difference to what we believe; 
engaging in reflection can help us believe 
correctly. Call this form of control indirect 
reflective control. an agent has indirect 
reflective control over whether she believes 
that p just in case she can actively engage 
in critical reflection that causally influences 
whether or not she holds the belief that p. 
While indirect reflective control involves 
our intentions, such control differs from 
intention- based doxastic control in the fol-
lowing way: intention- based doxastic control 
involves controlling our beliefs by carrying 
out intentions to believe specific proposi-
tions, whether directly or indirectly, which 
is something we cannot do in all or most 
cases. Indirect reflective control involves 
carrying out intentions to engage in various 
reflective activities, which in turn, causally 
influences whether we believe that p. This is 
something we can do, giving us influence- 
based control over our beliefs.26 Therefore, 
if we understand Doxastic Involuntarism in 
terms of this sort of control, then the thesis 
is false: it’s not the case that we never have 
control over what we believe because we 
sometimes have indirect reflective control 
over what we believe.
 Indirect reflective control helps us make 
sense of the legitimacy of blaming individuals 
for their beliefs despite the fact that we clearly 
do not have the same kind of control over our 
beliefs that we have over our actions.27 The 
upshot is that intention- based control is not 
the only type of control that helps explain the 
legitimacy of practices like blame.
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 Now consider faith. Though we lack direct 
intention- based control over whether we have 
faith, we can still explain the legitimacy of di-
recting and holding people accountable with 
respect to faith if we have indirect reflective 
control over whether we have faith. assume, 
for the purposes of illustration, that faith is a 
kind of belief, a kind of desire, and a kind of 
disposition to act, such that S has faith that p 
only if S believes that p, desires that p, and 
is disposed to act as if p.28 Though we cannot 
believe that p as a direct result of an intention 
to believe that p, we can carry out intentions 
to reflect on our reasons for believing that p, 
and doing so influences whether or not we 
have the belief. The same is plausibly true 
of desire: though we cannot desire that p as 
a direct result of an intention to desire p, we 
can carry out intentions to reflect on our rea-
sons for desiring p, and doing so influences 
whether or not we have the desire.
 using this model, it’s easy to see how it 
could be legitimate to encourage a person to 
have faith in cases where the agent already 
believes and desires p. The agent can just 
directly carry out an intention to act as if p 
upon being encouraged to have faith that p. I 
suspect that this is exactly what’s going on in 
many of the cases where people urge another 
to have faith: the person already believes and 
desires p, but for some reason, she’s not act-
ing like it. upon receiving the encouragement 
to have faith that p, the agent who believes 
and desires p can respond by reflecting on her 
belief and desire, which can help her realize 
that she also has reason to execute an inten-
tion to act as if p. Such reflection causally 
influences whether she has faith that p.
 But it’s also legitimate to encourage a 
person to have faith that p in a scenario in 
which the person has reason to believe that 
p and reason to desire that p, but hasn’t yet 
recognized those reasons. Here, we might 
exhort her to have faith that p, and she can 
respond to that exhortation by reflecting on 
her reasons for believing and desiring p. In 
other words, she can exercise indirect reflec-
tive control over whether she believes that 
p. and she can exercise a similar form of 
indirect control over whether she desires that 
p, by considering her reasons to desire it. She 
can also simultaneously carry out intentions 
to act as if p. Doing these things influences 
whether she has faith that p. In this way, 
agents have indirect reflective control over 
whether they have faith.
 What about a case in which the person lacks 
the belief and desire, and there is no reason 
to believe and desire p? In such a case, it is 
not legitimate to encourage the person to have 
faith that p. This is true even if we add to the 
case that having faith that p would make the 
person feel happy or cause her to be liked 
by others or enable her success in some en-
deavor. Though such reasons count in favor of 
having faith, they do so independently of the 
reasons relevant to the mental states included 
in the functional profile of faith—belief that 
p and desire that p. If the agent has no reason 
to believe that p and no reason to desire that 
p, then she ought not to have faith that p. This 
makes sense. It accords with the fact that it 
seems legitimate to criticize people for having 
faith that p when p is unjustified or undesir-
able.
 Note that there’s a difference between re-
flecting on whether to have faith that p and 
reflecting on whether to believe that p. For 
faith, it’s relevant to consider whether the 
object of one’s faith is desirable. But when 
considering what to believe, it’s not relevant 
to consider whether the object of one’s be-
lief (i.e., a proposition) is desirable. For the 
purposes of believing p, it doesn’t matter 
whether p is desirable or not. But for the 
purposes of having faith that p, it does matter. 
So it’s relevant to cite reasons pertaining to 
the goodness of p when encouraging a person 
to have faith that p. This is a way in which 
faith differs from belief and bears similarity 
to action, which is perhaps another reason 
people have thought that our control over 
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faith is like our control over action. However, 
as I’ve argued, our control over faith is more 
like our control over belief.
 While it’s legitimate to encourage and 
command people to have or abandon faith, 
it would be illegitimate to expect immediate 
compliance with the exhortation or to blame 
them for failing to comply immediately. But it 
would be perfectly legitimate to expect com-
pliance mediated by carrying out whatever 
relevant intentions are necessary—intentions 
to reflect on one’s reasons for believing and to 
reflect on one’s reasons for desiring, as well 
as one’s intentions to act as if p. So, even if 
we lack direct intention- based control over 
faith, we can still preserve the view that it’s 
legitimate to encourage agents to have faith 
and hold them accountable for such faith, 
given that we have indirect reflective control 
over faith.
5. another Solution?
 Before concluding, I want to clarify why I 
don’t solve the Control Puzzle by appealing 
to a different kind of control that one might 
think we have over both faith and belief: 
indirect intention- based control. If an agent 
has indirect intention- based control over 
φ- ing, then she has the ability to execute an 
intention to φ by executing intentions to do 
various actions or activities over time.
 I don’t appeal to indirect intention- based 
control to solve the Control Puzzle because, 
although it’s plausible that we sometimes 
have this control over faith and belief, such 
control does not sufficiently explain the legiti-
macy of our practices of holding individuals 
accountable for these attitudes.29 Individuals 
are held accountable for their beliefs and 
their faith in a wide variety of cases, but in 
many—perhaps even most—of those cases, 
the agents in question do not have indirect 
intention- based control over their beliefs or 
their faith. In order to have this control over 
a belief, an agent would need to be able to 
form an intention to believe that p for some 
specific proposition, and then execute that 
intention by doing various things that result in 
her believing that p. For example, she might 
conduct an investigation to find only evidence 
that confirms p, hang around only people who 
believe that p, confidently assert to herself and 
others that p is true, and so forth. although it’s 
plausible that an agent could successfully car-
ry out an intention to believe that p by these 
methods in at least some instances of belief, 
it seems that agents don’t have widespread 
control over their beliefs in this sense, given 
that these methods can be fairly difficult to 
carry out successfully.30 Moreover, exercising 
this control might lead to irrational beliefs, 
especially in cases in which one embarks on 
the process of producing a particular belief 
in oneself for reasons that are independent 
of the truth of the content of the belief. The 
situation is similar with respect to faith: if we 
choose to form an intention to have faith that 
p on the basis of considerations that support 
having the faith independently of supporting 
the truth or desirability of p, then it’s unlikely 
that we can indirectly execute the intention. 
Suppose you form the intention to have faith 
that your spouse is working hard. If it’s false 
that your spouse is working hard, then it will 
be difficult to carry out your intention as you 
continue to gather more evidence that your 
spouse is lazy.
 In any case, regardless of how often we 
have indirect intention- based control over be-
lief and faith, there is a principled reason why 
this form of control fails to adequately explain 
the legitimacy of holding agents accountable 
for these attitudes. Legitimate accountability 
for belief and for faith requires the capac-
ity for reflection on the part of the agent be-
ing held accountable; otherwise the agent in 
question cannot understand and respond to 
the accountability. It would not make sense, 
for example, to blame a friend for failing to 
have faith that you’ll keep your word if she 
can’t understand and respond to the reasons 
supporting such faith. So, the control that 
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helps explain the legitimacy of holding indi-
viduals accountable for their attitudes must be 
reflective, rather than intention- based.31 If this 
is right, then appealing to indirect reflective 
control to solve the Control Puzzle has the 
virtue of both resolving the Control Puzzle 
and adequately explaining the practices that 
help motivate one of the claims of the Control 
Puzzle—Fideistic Voluntarism. appealing to 
indirect intention- based control might resolve 
the Control Puzzle, but at the cost of sad-
dling us with the problem of explaining the 
legitimacy of holding people accountable for 
their faith and belief. So, appealing to indirect 
reflective control is a better solution.
Conclusion
 We began with the Control Puzzle: ac-
cording to the Identity Thesis, faith is a type 
of belief, and according to Fideistic Vol-
untarism, we sometimes have control over 
whether or not we have faith, but according 
to Doxastic Involuntarism, we never have 
control over what we believe. I argued that 
we should maintain the Identity Thesis, but 
then I argued that depending on the relevant 
notion of control, either we sometimes have 
control over both faith and belief, or we never 
have control over either. If the relevant control 
is direct intention- based control—the same 
control we have over action—then we never 
have control over whether we have faith or 
over what we believe. But if the relevant 
control is indirect reflective control, then we 
sometimes have control over whether we have 
faith and over what we believe. Moreover, I 
argued that having indirect reflective control 
over faith and over belief helps us best make 
sense of our practices of accountability with 
respect to each. The upshot is that we should 
be voluntarists in one sense, but not another, 
about both faith and belief. In the end, dis-
ambiguating the notion of control resolves 
the tension of the Control Puzzle.
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1. Robert audi calls this type of faith “attitudinal faith” (2011, p. 294), but I find this term rather 
misleading given that propositional faith can also be considered an attitude.
2. as Lara Buchak observes, faith statements typically involve a proposition in some way: for example, 
when one has faith in a person, one plausibly has faith that the person is reliable or faith that the person 
will come through or that she will triumph, and so forth (2012, pp. 225–226). additionally, insofar as 
one thinks that belief- in presupposes belief- that (i.e., propositional belief), one might think that the 
same is true for faith—that faith- in presupposes faith- that. For arguments that belief- in presupposes 
belief- that, see Kenny (1992, p. 66; 2007); Plantinga and Wolterstorff (1983, p. 18); Price (1965, p. 
13); and Swinburne (1969).
3. See Lewis (1966; 1972) for more background on the sort of functionalism that I have in mind.
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4. even those who have fairly different views of faith overall seem to share the view that some sort 
of pro- attitude is essential to faith; see, for example, adams (1995, pp. 88–89); alston (1996, p. 12); 
audi (2008, p. 97); and Howard- Snyder (2013, p. 360). Though, of course, not all views of faith re-
quire a pro- attitude. For example, one might hold the view that faith that p is a kind of belief based on 
testimony, without any requirement that the agent have a pro- attitude toward p.
5. It’s worth noting that if faith is a type of desire or a type of intention, then it’s likely there are similar 
control puzzles lurking. In other words, we can use identity theses concerning the relationship between 
faith and various other attitudes to generate control puzzles similar to the belief control puzzle that I 
focus on in this paper.
6. For more on the general problem of positing necessary connections between distinct existences, 
see armstrong (1968) and Lewis (1972). See also Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (bk. 1, Part III, 
sec. XIV), from which armstrong and Lewis draw their inspiration.
7. For more discussion of the relation between material constitution and identity, see Baker (1997).
8. The functionalist model of the relationship between faith and belief is similar to Sydney Shoe-
maker’s functionalist model of the relationship between a first- order belief that p and the second- order 
belief that one believes that p: see Shoemaker (2009) in which he explicates in functionalist terms the 
constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it.
9. Swinburne (2005, pp. 138–141).
10. See alston (1996, p. 15); aquinas’s Summa Theologica (II- II, Q. 2, art. 9); and Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (IV, 18, 2; emphasis added).
11. However, alston interprets “assent” in these passages to refer to mental acceptance (1996, p. 8).
12. See Kinghorn (2005) for a discussion of this presupposition in the Christian religious tradition; 
see Pojman (1986, pp. 157–158) for a discussion of the view held by ordinary people “in the pew” that 
adhering to the Christian faith involves having particular propositional beliefs.
13. according to McKaughan (2013, p. 103), similar claims are also found in Locke (1965).
14. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith, and http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/faith (both ac-
cessed January 10, 2017).
15. See Kvanvig (2013, pp. 109–110) for a discussion of some of these objections.
16. or, as I noted earlier in the section, it might be that the functional role of faith that p includes the 
functional role of the belief that p is likely, or more likely than not, and so on, rather than the belief 
that p.
17. See Peels (unpublished manuscript) for a nice categorization of the various types of doubt, as well 
as an argument for which types are compatible with the various types of faith. See also Peels (2007).
18. Note that acceptance and assumption that p seem perfectly compatible with strong doubt that p. 
We can imagine Captain Morgan doubting that help lies ahead. But he’s got to do something, so he 
assumes that help is ahead.
19. For simplicity, I’ve characterized this view in terms of belief, but the thesis of doxastic involuntarism 
can apply equally to other doxastic attitudes, such as disbelief and suspension of judgment.
20. See Hieronymi (2005; 2006; 2009). other advocates of the view that given the concept of belief, we 
lack direct intention- based doxastic control, include Bennett (1990); Williams (1973); Setiya (2008); 
Scott- Kakures (1993); and Shah (2002).
21. of course, one might be wrong about whether one’s reasons for a belief actually count in favor of 
its truth; one might believe something for bad reasons. and it’s often the case that agents can’t justify 
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their beliefs with good truth- related reasons. But Hieronymi’s point remains that one can only believe 
a proposition (i.e., be committed to its truth) for reasons that one takes to count in favor of the truth of 
the proposition.
22. See Swinburne (2005, pp. 264–268). For discussion, see Hartman (2011); and Kinghorn (2005).
23. of course, a full characterization of what is going on when people say these kinds of things to 
others is much more complex. I merely want to note that since people act and speak in ways that seem 
to presuppose control over faith in a way similar to control over actions, this provides some reason for 
thinking that an account of control over faith must be similar to our account of control over action.
24. See Hartman (2011, p. 184). See also Kinghorn (2005).
25. or at least faith that p is incompatible with not having some form of pro- attitude toward p.
26. one might wonder whether the causal influence discussed here is strong enough to count as control. 
But recall that we’re trying to make sense of the legitimacy of our practice of doxastic blame, so the 
control we’re interested in is that which satisfies the control condition for legitimate doxastic blame. 
Though influence- based control is causally weaker than intention- based control, it still suffices to sat-
isfy this condition. Indeed, there are many things for which we are legitimately blameworthy, but over 
which we only have influence- based control, such as various emotions, desires, and character traits, as 
well as various states of affairs, like our health.
27. I argue extensively for this in Rettler (forthcoming).
28. This model is too simplistic, since, among other things, the belief in question might not be belief 
that p (but could instead be some other related belief). Similarly, the desire in question might not be 
desire that p but some other desire in virtue of which one cares about p, such as a desire to desire that 
p. But for the purposes of illustrating our control over faith, it will do just fine.
29. I defend this at length with respect to doxastic attitudes in Rettler (forthcoming).
30. See Hieronymi (2006, pp. 54–55) for an argument that it’s possible we have indirect intention- 
based control, which she calls “managerial control,” over some of our beliefs. and see alston (1988, 
pp. 263–277) for more on the difficulty of exercising this kind of control over our beliefs.
31. See Rettler (forthcoming).
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